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Abstract
The literature on political business cycles suggests that politicians systemati-
cally manipulate economic and fiscal conditions before elections. The literature on
vote and popularity functions suggests that economic conditions systematically af-
fect election outcomes. This paper integrates these two strands of literature. We use
Rogoﬀ (1990)’s model of the rational political business cycle to derive the two-way
relationship between the win-margin of the incumbent politician and the size of the
opportunistic distortion of fiscal policy. This relationship is estimated, for a panel
of 275 Portuguese municipalities (from 1979 to 2001), as a system of simultaneous
equations (by GMM). The results clearly support the theoretical predictions: (1) op-
portunism pays oﬀ, leading to a larger win-margin for the incumbent; (2) incumbents
behave more opportunistically when they expect a close election race.
Keywords: Voting and popularity functions, opportunism, rational political busi-
ness cycles, local government, system estimation, Portugal.
JEL codes: D72, E32, H72.
1 Introduction
To what extent are economic policies in democratic societies distorted by the competitive
struggle for votes? How strong is the impact of the economy on election results? These
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questions have occupied researchers for a long time, but have mostly been investigated
separately. On the one hand, the literature on political business cycles (PBCs) focuses on
identifying distortions in macroeconomic and fiscal variables around election times.1 On
the other hand, the literature on vote and popularity (VP) functions focuses on identifying
the impact of economic and fiscal conditions on election results.2 Yet, the PBC and the
VP function are intimately related: rational politicians would not attempt to create a
political business cycle if it did not help them win elections and rational voters would not
base their vote decisions on economic and fiscal conditions if it did not help them select
better politicians. The aim of this paper is to bridge these two strands of literature and
to estimate the VP function and the fiscal distortion created by opportunistic politicians
trying to win elections jointly. This allows us to provide a new test of the rational political
business cycle theory proposed by Rogoﬀ and Sibert (1988) and Rogoﬀ (1990).
Research on electoral economics took oﬀ in the 1970s with the seminal works of Good-
hart and Bhansali (1970), Mueller (1970), and Kramer (1971) on the VP function and with
the work of Nordhaus (1975) and Hibbs (1977) on political business cycles. Right from
the beginning, the two literatures developed in parallel and, with the notable exception
of Frey and Schneider (1978a,b) who estimated politico-economy models for the United
States and the United Kingdom that took the interrelations between the economy and the
polity explicitly into account, there was little attempt of integration.
The rational expectations revolution brought new challenges to the literature which
had to raise to the challenge that rational voters cannot be systematically fooled one elec-
tion after the other by opportunistic politicians. New models were developed where the
PBC resulted from asymmetries of information between politicians and voters. Alesina
(1987), for example, showed how pre-election uncertainty about the ideology of competing
political parties can explain rational partisan cycles in macroeconomic aggregates. Around
the same time, Rogoﬀ and Sibert (1988) and Rogoﬀ (1990) developed the canonical model
of the rational political business cycle in which incumbents signal their competence to the
1See Paldam (1997), Alesina et al. (1997), Drazen (2000: 219-308) or Mueller (2003: 429-471) for
surveys of this literature.
2See Nannestad and Paldam (1994) and Paldam (2004) for surveys. For a study of vote and popularity
functions in the United Kingdom, see Pissarides (1980) and Borooah and van der Ploeg (1982).
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electorate by manipulating fiscal policy instruments before elections.3 With the introduc-
tion of rational expectations into the models, empirical research shifted the focus from data
on aggregate economic outcomes to data on economic policy instruments, particularly to
those of fiscal policy. To some extent, the emphasis also shifted from the national to the
sub-national level with an increasing interest in the study of political business cycles in lo-
cal and state elections.4 The interest in political business cycles has recently been renewed,
but the current discussion is predominately about which characteristics of a polity might
support or discourage political business cycles. According to Shi and Svensson (2006), the
magnitude of electoral budget cycles increase with the size of the rent that politicians can
earn by remaining in oﬃce and with the share of informed voters in the electorate. Brender
and Drazen (2005) argue that opportunistic fiscal manipulations are more pronounced in
"new" than in "established" democracies because, in the former, voters are inexperienced
with electoral politics and are less able to detect fiscal manipulations. On the other hand,
Alt and Lassen (2006) argue that, conditional on the degree of fiscal transparency, political
business cycles are as likely in advanced industrialized economies as elsewhere.
Yet, the two-way relationship between elections and the economy remains under-
researched, and only rational partisan theory has been properly tested in such a setting.
Using an empirical model that allows for the joint determination of economic growth and
national election outcomes in the United States, Alesina et al. (1993) report evidence
that growth responds to unanticipated policy shifts and that the economy has a strong
eﬀect on voting in presidential elections. Part of the reason why so few studies attempt
to integrate the PBC and the VP function is, as pointed out by Willet and Keil (2004:
414) in their survey of the literature, that the micro incentives behind, in particular the
3Some public choice scholars have pointed to an alternative explanation of the PBC: rational ignorance
of voters in the face of information costs. Instead of assuming that citizens have high levels of information
that allow them to detect and punish opportunistic politicians, they argue that many economic actors
have little incentive to be informed about economic policies and that opportunistic politicians will take
advantage of this, in particular when the percentage of uninformed voters is high (see Willet and Keil
(2004)).
4Blais and Nadeau (1992) and Rosenberg (1992) where the first to test political budgetary cycles using
local data. For an extended revision of the empirical literature about the U.S. see Besley and Case (2003).
For studies about Germany see Seitz (2000) and Galli and Rossi (2002). For Sweden see Petterson-Lidbom
(2001). Finally, see Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) for Russia, Drazen and Eslava (2005) for Colombia,
and Veiga and Veiga (2007) for Portugal.
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rational political business cycle, have received insuﬃcient empirical attention.
Theoretically, these incentives are clear: PBC models with rational voters a la Rogoﬀ
(1990) not only predict that politicians will try to signal their type by distorting fiscal
choices before elections, it also suggests that politicians are rewarded for doing so at the
polls. In fact, the theory suggests that the vote and popularity function and the fiscal dis-
tortion created by opportunistic politicians are jointly determined and therefore should be
estimated together. Two recent studies by Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) and Drazen
and Eslava (2005), dealing with local governments in Russia and Colombia respectively,
do estimate vote and popularity functions along side with tests for opportunistic cycles
in fiscal policy, but treat the two as being independent. To the best of our knowledge,
no study has yet taken the theory seriously and attempted to estimate the vote function
and the extent of the opportunistic political business cycle jointly as a system of equa-
tions. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap. We, firstly, develop a version of the
canonical model of the rational political business cycle from which we derive the two equa-
tions to be estimated. Secondly, we estimate these equations on data from 278 Portuguese
municipalities using a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) system estimator.
We use data from Portuguese municipalities for several reasons. First, we have com-
piled a large and detailed data set covering all mainland municipalities (278) since 1979
to 2001 (seven elections). Second, the mayor is the principal decision-maker in the mu-
nicipality and is in a position from which he can manipulate important expenditure items
for election purpose. Third, all Portuguese municipalities operate under the same institu-
tional framework and have access to the same policy instruments. This allow us to avoid
many of the pitfalls associated with cross national studies. Finally, election dates are fixed
and exogenous from the perspective of the local authorities, and all municipalities have
elections on the same day. Taken together these factors make this data set a very promis-
ing testing ground for a study of the interrelationship between the VP function and the
political business cycle.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some institutional information
about the Portuguese municipalities. Section 3 describes the model and derives the two
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equations to be estimated. Section 4 discusses the data sources and the empirical strat-
egy adopted. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Finally, section 6 contains the
conclusions.
2 Local Government in Portugal
The Portuguese municipalities were formally established by the Constitution of 1976, after
the bloodless military coup of April 25, 1974, which put an end to 48 years of dictatorship.
The first municipal election took place in December of 1976. Until 1985 elections were held
every third year and after that every fourth year. Election dates are fixed nationally and
therefore exogenous from the perspective of the municipalities. During our sample period
(1979-2001), all elections took place in December and there were no legal restrictions on
the number of times a mayor could stand for election.
The municipalities are governed by the Municipal Assembly and the Town Council.5
The Municipal Assembly has deliberative power and it approves the general policy frame-
work. The presidents of the councils of the freguesias,6 which make up each municipality,
are automatically members of the Assembly, while the rest are elected directly by the vot-
ers registered in the municipality. The Town Council holds executive power and it designs
and implements local policies. Its members are all elected directly by citizens who vote for
party or independent lists of candidates.7 The top candidate from the list that receives
the most votes becomes mayor. The mayor is the president of the Town Council and plays
a leading role in the executive and has substantial power and autonomy.
The municipalities are responsible for a large variety of activities, ranging from urban
planning and territory organization to the supply of local public services and regulation.
The local public services controlled by the municipalities include sewage, distribution of
5Law 169/99 establishes the competencies and the legal framework for the various branches of the
municipalities.
6Freguesias are subdivisions of municipalities. They are the lowest administrative unit in Portugal.
7Votes are transformed into seats using the Hondt method. After all the votes have been tallied, the
following quotient (V/(S+1)) is calculated for each party, where V is the total number of votes that the list
received and S is the number of seats that the party has been allocated so far (initially 0 for all parties).
The party having the highest quotient gets the first seat allocated, and its quotient is recalculated given
its new seat total. The process is repeated until all seats have been allocated.
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water and energy, local transportation and communication, elementary education, patri-
mony, promotion of culture and science, provision of recreation and sports facilities, local
health care, social housing, environmental protection and municipal policing.
The municipalities operate within the same institutional framework and are all sub-
ject to the same financial regime.8,9 With this common regime, the municipalities are
financially autonomous and can, without authorization from a higher-ranked authority,
define their own budget, collect the revenues they are entitled by law and allocate expen-
ditures.10 Nonetheless, the Town Council and the mayor who heads it have relatively little
discretional power with regard to revenues, as, on average, 70% of per capita income are
transfers from the central government and/or from the European Union. Moreover, the
bulk of current expenditures go to salaries, expenditures on electricity, water, etc., and
are largely non-discretionary and hard to manipulate. Importantly, however, the mayors
can control the level and timing of capital expenditures, which, along with the fact that
these are highly visible spending items, make them appropriate targets for mayors willing
to woo voters to win elections.
3 Theory
In this section, we lay out a version of the rational political business cycle model developed
by Rogoﬀ (1990) and Rogoﬀ and Sibert (1988). The purpose of the exercise is, firstly, to
draw out implications of the theory which have not yet been subject to systematic testing
and, secondly, to allow theory to guide our empirical identification strategy.
3.1 The model
We consider a simple two-period economy (t = 1, 2) populated with a continuum of citizen-
voters.11 Citizen-voters care about private consumption (ct) and two types of public goods
8During the period analyzed four local finance laws were introduced: Law 1/79, Decree-Law 98/84,
Law 1/87, and Law 42/98.
9For a detailed description of municipal finances in Portugal, see Veiga and Veiga (2007).
10They are of course subject to several control mechanisms by central government agencies, but these
are merely inspective.
11The model is a simplified version of Rogoﬀ (1990).
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(g1,t and g2,t+1). Public good 1 (g1) is a short-term public good while public good 2 (g2)
is a long-term public good. Investments in the short-term public good lead to immediate
provision of services that can be directly observed within the period. Investments in the
long-term public good, on the other hand, lead to provision only with a one period time
lag. As a consequence, citizen-voters cannot infer how much was invested in this good until
later when they observe the provision levels generated by past investments. The life-time
utility function of a representative citizen-voter is
uv = c1 + ln g1,1 + θ ln g2,1 + β (c2 + ln g1,2 + θ ln g2,2) , (1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and θ is the relative importance of long-term public
goods.12 Each citizen-voter is endowed with y units of a non-storable good each period,
pays the lump sum tax τ t and consumes ct = y − τ t. Public goods are produced from tax
revenues by an elected politician using a simple linear technology:
g1,t + g2,t+1 = τ t + εt (2)
where εt is a stochastic competency term. We note that the cost of investment in the
long-term public good provided in period t+ 1 is incurred in period t.
Each period a citizen-voter is elected to run the government and to produce public
goods. To simplify the analysis, we assume that τ is exogenously given and that the
politician, therefore, only has to decide on the allocation of resources between the two
types of public goods. Citizen-voters diﬀer with respect to their talent for being politicians
and some are more competent than others. Specifically, a citizen-voter is either competent
(εt = εH) or incompetent (εt = εL < εH) as a politician. We assume that competency
is permanent, i.e., if a politician is competent in period 1 he is also competent in period
2 and vice versa. The probability that a randomly selected citizen-voter is competent is
ρ ∈ (0, 1). Politicians derive utility from private and public goods, but also care about
holding oﬃce per se because of the power or prestige that goes with it. To capture this,
we assume that politicians receive the ego-rent m per period in oﬃce. In addition to
competency, citizen-voters also care about the ideology of their elected politician. This
12We assume that g2,1 = 1.
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is modelled as a random shock to citizen-voters’ preference for the incumbent relative to
that of the challenger in each election. Specifically, we assume that the relative ideological
advantage of the incumbent at time t is αt which is drawn before each election from a
uniform distribution on [−a, b] with b ≥ a. The ideological bias lasts for one period only
and is unrelated to competency.
The information structure of the model can best be laid out by listing the timing of
events:
1. At the beginning of period 1, the incumbent observes his competency ε1 and decides
on how to allocate resources between the two public goods (g1,1, g2,2).
2. Voters observe α1 and how much is provided of the short-term public good (g1,1).
3. At the end of period 1, an election takes place where the incumbent runs against
a randomly chosen challenger. The incumbent is reelected if he is supported by a
majority of citizen-voters; otherwise the challenger takes oﬃce.
4. At the beginning of period 2, the incumbent, if reelected, decides how much to
invest in the short-term public good.13 If the challenger is elected, she observes her
competency (ε2) and decides on how much to invest in the short-term public good.
We notice that the incumbent in period 1 does not observe the ideological bias until
after he has decided fiscal policy for the period. This, as we shall see, implies that he cannot
be sure about the outcome of the election. He does, however, know the distribution and
that allows him to form a judgement about how close or competitive the election is going
to be.
The structure described above is a sequential game of incomplete information and the
natural solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). A PBE is a pair of first-
period fiscal allocations
©
gL1,t, gH1,t
ª
, one for each type, and a reelection rule for citizen-voters
(that determines the probability of reelecting the incumbent as a function of observed fiscal
13In period 2, nothing is invested in the long-term public good because it is the last period.
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policy) such that the incumbent of each type selects an optimal fiscal allocation given the
reelection rule; citizen-voters’ reelection rule is optimal given their beliefs about the type of
the incumbent and the incumbent’s strategies; and beliefs are whenever possible updated
according to Bayes’s rule. To narrow down the set of equilibria, we shall impose additional
restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs below.
3.2 Equilibria
We begin by noting that the optimal fiscal policy in the second period is to invest all
resources in the short-term public good and so g1,2 = τ + εi irrespective of the type of the
second-period incumbent. Supposing that the first-period incumbent is reelected, we can
write the second-period utility of a citizen-voter, net of the benefit of the long-term public
good, as a function of the type of the first-period incumbent as
W (i) = y − τ + ln(τ + εi) for i ∈ {L,H}, (3)
The corresponding net second-period utility if a challenger of unknown type is elected is
W (C) = y − τ + ρ ln(τ + εH) + (1− ρ) ρ ln(τ + εL), (4)
where C represents "challenger". If citizen-voters only cared about provision of public
goods, then it is clear from these expressions that they would reelect an incumbent who
is known to be competent for sure and boot out an incumbent who is known to be incom-
petent. However, in practice citizen-voters also care about ideology and a representative
citizen-voter casts a vote in favour of the incumbent if and only if
bρ (g1,1)W (H) + (1− bρ (g1,1))W (L)−W (C) + α1 ≥ 0, (5)
where bρ (g1,1) represents the citizen-voters’ updated beliefs (that the incumbent if of type
H) after having observed the first-period investment in short-term public goods. From
the point of view of the first-period incumbent, who does not observe α1 until after he has
decided on fiscal policy, the probability of getting reelected is
π(bρ (g1,1)) = ba+ b + bρ (g1,1)W (H) + (1− bρ (g1,1))W (L)−W (C)a+ b (6)
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which is increasing in the belief that the incumbent is competent.14 We see that the
reelection probability consists of two terms which we shall call the natural advantage and
the signalling term respectively. Following Snyder (1989) and others, we say that the
incumbent has a natural advantage in the election if, under the condition that both types
of incumbents choose the same level of spending and thus bρ (.) = ρ, the probability of
reelection is greater than 1
2
. Notice that for bρ (.) = ρ, we have
π(ρ) =
b
a+ b
. (7)
The incumbent’s natural advantage is increasing in b and the closer b is to a the more com-
petitive or close is the election. The eﬀect of b on the signalling term, bρ(g1,1)W (H)+(1−bρ(g1,1))W (L)−W (C)a+b
is, on the other hand, ambiguous and depends on the sign of the nominator. If, given their
beliefs, voters expect the incumbent to deliver better outcomes than the challenger, then
a larger natural advantage reduces the marginal eﬀect on the reelection probability of
signalling. Conversely, if voters expect the incumbent to deliver worse outcomes than
the challenger, then a larger natural advantage decreases the (negative) marginal eﬀect of
signalling.
Faced with this reelection rule, the first-period incumbent, whether competent or not,
decides how to allocate resources between the two types of public goods taking into account
how this choice aﬀects his reelection chances. Following Persson and Tabellini (1990,
chapter 5), it is convenient to define the following two objects: the value of reelected and
the cost of signalling. The (expected) value of being reelected for a politician of type εi is
V (εi) = m+ (W (i)−W (C)) . (8)
He gets the ego-rent for another period and benefits (or not) from the fact that he, in
expectation, is more (or less) eﬃcient at providing public goods than a randomly chosen
challenger. We assume thatm is suﬃciently large to make V (εL) > 0.The cost of signalling
is
C
¡
gi1,1, εi
¢
= ln
µ
τ + εi
1 + βθ
¶
+ βθ ln
µ
βθ (τ + εi)
1 + βθ
¶
(9)
− ln gi1,1 − βθ ln
¡
τ + εi − gi1,1
¢
.
14We assume throughout that a is such that π ∈ (0, 1) for all bρ.
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Signaling entails a distortion of first-period resources (too much is spent on short-term
public goods and too little is spent on long-term public goods). The cost of signalling,
therefore, is the diﬀerence between the short-run optimal allocation of first-period resources
between short- and long-term public goods and the actual choice of allocation (gi1,1).15
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium) The unique intuitive Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in un-
dominated strategies is a separating equilibrium and is characterized by the following strate-
gies and beliefs:
1. An incumbent of type L sets gL1,1 =
τ+εL
1+βθ and g
L
2,2 =
βθ(τ+εL)
1+βθ in period 1. If reelected,
he sets gL1,2 = τ + εL in period 2.
2. An incumbent of type H sets gH1,1 = gs1,1 and gH2,2 =
¡
τ + εH − gs1,1
¢
in period 1 where
gs1,1 = max
½
τ + εH
1 + βθ
, gs
¾
(10)
with gs being defined as
gs = max
©
g|C (g, εL) = β
¡
π
¡bρ ¡gs1,1¢¢− π ¡bρ ¡gL1,1¢¢¢V (εL)ª . (11)
If reelected, he sets gH1,2 = τ + εH in period 2
3. Citizen-voters’ posterior beliefs are bρ (g1,1) = 1 for all g1,1 ≥ gs1,1 and bρ (g1,1) = 0 for
all g1,1 < gs1,1 and the reelection rule is given by equation (5).
Proof. See Appendix
The equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1 where we have drawn the cost of signaling
and the expected value of reelection for the two types of incumbents as a function of g1,1.
The expected value of reelection is always larger for a competent than for an incompe-
tent incumbent. This is because the former can provide more second-period public goods
than the average politician while the latter cannot. The cost of signaling is represented by
15With the logaritmic utility functions, the short-run optimal allocation is bgi1,1 = τ+εi1+βθ and bgi2,2 =
βθ(τ+εi)
1+βθ .
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Figure 1: Separating Equilibria
the parabolas with the competent incumbent’s cost of signaling shifted to the right reflect-
ing the fact that it is "cheaper" for the competent incumbent to increase spending on the
short-term public good from his short-run optimal level (τ+εH
1+βθ ) than it is for the incom-
petent incumbent to match it. In a separating equilibrium, an incumbent of type L sets
gL1,1 =
τ+εL
1+βθ and prefers to do so pretending to be competent as long as g
H
1,1 is no less than
gs. An incumbent of type H, on the other hand, is, if needed, willing to deviate upwards
from his short-run optimal policy choice to signal to citizen-voters that he is competent
as long as the cost of signaling is no greater than the expected benefit of reelection. Any
gH1,1 in the interval A, indicated with the bold line in the Figure, constitute a separating
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. It is clear, however, that gH1,1 > gs is more costly to the
competent incumbent and thus dominated by gH1,1 = gs.16 The theory therefore predicts
that fiscal policy is distorted before the election because competent politicians need to
convince rational voters that they are indeed competent. This is the Rational Political
Business Cycle (RPBC).
The extent of signalling depends among other things on the natural advantage of the
incumbent (captured by b) as shown in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 (Natural Advantage) (1) The larger the natural advantage of the incum-
16Since reelection is random, pooling equilibria in which both types of incumbents chose g1,1 = τ+εH1+βθ
in period 1 can be ruled out by the intuitive criterion.
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bent is, the lower is the incentive of the competent incumbent to signal, i.e., gH1,1 = gs
is non-increasing in b. (2) Moreover, having a natural advantage increases the reelection
chance of all types of incumbents.
Proof. Part (1). From equation (11), we note that the degree of signalling depends on
π (1)− π (0) = W (H)−W (L)
a+ b
which is clearly decreasing in b. It follows that dg
s
db ≤ 0. Part (2). Notice that
π(1) =
b
a+ b
+
W (H)−W (C)
a+ b
(12)
π(0) =
b
a+ b
+
W (L)−W (C)
a+ b
(13)
It is immediate that ∂π(0)∂b > 0 since W (L)−W (C) < 0. Calculate
∂π(1)
∂b
=
a− (W (H)−W (C))
(a+ b)2
. (14)
Since we assume that π (1) < 1, it must be the case that − (W (H)−W (C)) > −a and so
∂π(1)
∂b > 0
The proposition shows that, ceteris paribus, the need for competent incumbents to
signal their competency is larger in situations where incumbency is not associated with
a large natural advantage. In other words, the political business cycle peaks when the
election race is "close". The reason is that the marginal value of signalling (in terms
of improved reelection chances) is higher in situations where voters are not ideologically
committed to the incumbent. The second part of the proposition shows that having a
natural advantage, ceteris paribus, improves the reelection prospect irrespective of the
incumbent’s type.
3.3 Empirical Implications of the Theory
We are interested in testing the relationship implied by the theory between what we
might call the (average) opportunistic distortion (OD) and the (average) win-margin of
the incumbent (WM). Theoretically, the opportunistic distortion is given by
ρ
µ
gs(b; θ, τ ,m)− τ + εH
1 + βθ
¶
, (15)
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where gs is implicitly defined by equation (11), and is simply an ex ante measure of the
size of the average political business cycle. Theoretically, the average win-margin can be
defined as
ρπ
¡bρ ¡gH1,1¢¢+ (1− ρ)π ¡bρ ¡gL1,1¢¢ , (16)
which is the type-weighted ex ante probability that the incumbent is reelected. According
to the theory, OD andWM are jointly determined at equilibrium: the degree of signalling
along with the natural advantage of the incumbent determine the win margin, while the
win margin, through its eﬀect on the reelection diﬀerential between competent and incom-
petent politicians, determines the degree of signalling and thus the size of the opportunistic
distortion. We can therefore write the structural form of the model laid out above as
WM = β1OD + Zβz (17)
OD = φ1WM +Xφx, (18)
where β1, φ1, βz and φx are scalars and vectors of parameters respectively andX and Z are
(possibly overlapping) vectors of other determinants of the opportunistic distortion and
the win-margin. The theory of the RPBC imposes restrictions on β1 and φ1 which we are
interested in testing. Firstly, since the posterior belief that the incumbent is competent,bρ (g1,1), is non-decreasing in g1,1, the model predicts that opportunistic behavior pays oﬀ
in the sense that the win-margin is (weakly) increasing in the size of the opportunistic
distortion (β1 ≥ 0). Secondly, the theory predicts that the eﬀect of an increase in the
win-margin on the opportunistic distortion can be decomposed into two separate eﬀects
related to signalling and to the natural advantage of the incumbent respectively. First,
there is a self-reinforcing positive link between the degree of signalling and the win-margin.
To see this, notice that starting from a hypothetical situation where gH1,1 < gs, an increase
in gH1,1 increases π(bρ (.)) which in turn increases the benefit of signalling (see equation (11)).
Second, an increase in the win-margin triggered by an increase in the natural advantage
of the incumbent leads to a reduction in the opportunistic distortion (see proposition 2).
Empirically, we conjecture that the second eﬀect is more important and our null hypothesis
is that the opportunistic distortion is larger the closer the election, i.e., (φ1 ≤ 0).
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As noted above both the win-margin and the opportunistic distortion are endogenous
variables. Accordingly, to identify the links between them empirically, we need to impose
restrictions on the structure form. We use the theory to motivate some of these exclusion
restrictions. Firstly, we note that the parameter θ, which controls the relative importance
of long-term versus short-term public goods, aﬀects the opportunistic distortion directly,
while its impact on the win-margin is indirect (through its eﬀect on the opportunistic
distortion). In particular, the larger is θ, the higher the cost of signaling and the lower is
gs and, ceteris paribus, the opportunistic distortion.17 More broadly, we can interpret θ
as a measure of voter awareness of the opportunity cost of spending on easily observable
expenditure items. Secondly, the availability of funds (τ) also has a direct (positive) eﬀect
on gs because the cost of signalling falls and the value of reelection (V (εL)) increases,
while the eﬀect on the win-margin is indirect. Thirdly, the ego-rent increases the benefit of
reelection and directly increases the opportunistic distortion. Based on these observations,
it is reasonable to exclude factors that aﬀect voter awareness, the availability of funds and
the ego-rent from the equation for the win-margin. On the other hand, the opportunistic
distortion is unlikely to be directly aﬀected by general economic conditions, while these
factors are likely to aﬀect the win-margin directly. We shall build on this identification
strategy in the empirical specification below and defined X and Z accordingly.
4 Data and Empirical Specification
The data set consists of political, financial and economic variables for the 278 Portuguese
mainland municipalities, for the local election years of 1979, 1982, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997
and 2001.18 Municipal election dates and results were obtained from the Technical Staﬀ
17Diﬀerentiating equation (9) with respect to θ gives:
∂C(., εL)
∂θ
= ln
µ
βθ (τ + εL)
1 + βθ
¶
− ln (τ + εL − gs) +
1
θ (1 + βθ)
> 0.
This implies that ∂g
s
∂θ < 0. Since
(τ+εH)
1+βθ also decreases in θ, the overall eﬀect on the opportunistic
distortion is ambiguous.
18Although there also was an election in October 2005, data from the municipal financial accounts are
only available until 2003. The election of 1979 is not included in the analysis whenever lags, term averages
or deviations from term averages are included. For the three municipalities created in 1997 (Odivelas,
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for Matters Concerning the Electoral Process (Secretariado Técnico dos Assuntos para o
Processo Eleitoral - STAPE) of the Internal Aﬀairs Ministry. Data on municipal local
accounts were obtained from the local authority’s (Direcção Geral das Autarquias Locais -
DGAL) annual publication called Finanças Municipais (Municipal Finances). This report
exists from 1979 to 1983 and from 1986 to 2003. For the two missing years data was
obtained directly from the municipalities’ oﬃcial accounts and are incomplete: we have
182 observations for 1984 and 189 for 1985. The consumer price index and the national
unemployment rate were taken from the OECD’s Main Economic Indicators. Data on
the total number of employees in firms within each municipality and on their average
wages, from 1985 to 2003, was obtained from the “Quadros de Pessoal” database, of the
Portuguese Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity (MTSS).19 Finally, demographic data
was obtained from the National Statistics Oﬃce (INE).
As discussed above, our empirical model consists of a system of two simultaneous
equations: a vote and popularity function representing the win-margin and an equation
for the opportunistic distortion. We measure the win-margin of the incumbent as the
diﬀerence between the vote share of the mayor’s party and that of the largest opposition
party. We measure the opportunistic distortion as the percentage deviation of investment
expenditures (IE) in an election year from the election term average. The later choice is
motivated by the fact that opportunistic distortions are, in practice, most likely to show up
in budgetary items whose timing of implementation is controlled by the mayor and which
are visible to the electorate. As noted in section 2, the municipalities do not have much
freedom to set revenue instruments, as transfers from the national government represent
the main source of funding, and current expenditures are strongly conditioned by salaries
which are regulated by rigid labor contracts. Accordingly, investment expenditures, which
Trofa and Vizela) there is only election data for 2001 (the last election in our sample), which means that
there is no data for the votes obtained in the previous elections. Thus, in the estimations, we have a
maximum of 275 municipalities.
19The “Quadros de Pessoal” is a yearly mandatory employment survey that covers virtually all privately
owned firms employing paid labor in Portugal (public servants and own employment are not included).
Although the most recent year for which data is available is 2003, there is no data on wages for 2001. In
order to avoid missing values, for each municipality, we set the wages for 2001 equal to the simple average
between those of 2000 and 2002.
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are largely controlled by the mayors, are the most likely place to look for evidence of
opportunistic behavior.20
Based on the discussion of exclusion restrictions above, we can expand equations (17)
and (18) as follows:
WMit = β1ODit + β2IEit + β3YMit + β4RRit (19)
+β5WMi,prev.el. + β6GPit + β7Empit
+β8Wagesit + νi + δt + it
ODit = φ1WMit + φ2IEit + φ3YMit + φ4RRit (20)
+φ5CTtmit + φ6∆CTit + φ7Pop65it
+φ8PopDensit + φ9Rightit + γi + ϕt + μit
where i = 1, ....., 275 is the index for municipalities and t indicates election years.21 Both
equations include municipal fixed eﬀects (γi and υi) and election year fixed eﬀects (ϕt and
δt). β1 to β8 and φ1 to φ9 are parameters to be estimated and μit and it are random
error terms with E(μit) = E (it) = 0. Our main objective is to estimate jointly the eﬀect
of opportunism (OD) on the win-margin (WM) and the eﬀect of the win-margin on the
degree of opportunism. The theoretical analysis suggests that β1 > 0 and φ1 < 0.
We divide the exogenous variables into three groups. The first group contains three
variables that are included in both equations. They are: average investment expenditures
during the election term preceding the election of year t (IE); the number of years the
incumbent mayor has been in oﬃce (YM); and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the in-
cumbent mayor runs for reelection and 0 otherwise (RR). We expect that low average
investment expenditures (IE) make it easier to be opportunistic and to create a large per-
centage deviation of investment expenditures from the average at election times (φ2 < 0).
We also expect that average investment expenditures are positively related to the win-
margin as voters reward mayors for keeping investments high on average throughout the
term (β2 > 0). We expect that the number of years the incumbent mayor has served
20For results indicating that opportunism occurs in investment expenditures, see Veiga and Veiga (2007).
21The election years are 1979, 1982, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997 and 2001.
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(YM) reduces the win-margin because, as documented by e.g., Mueller (1970), Frey and
Schneider (1978a,b) and Veiga and Veiga (2004a), popularity tends to erode with time in
oﬃce (β3 < 0), and that mayors with longer tenures are more experienced and so are more
able to manage investment expenditures opportunistically (φ3 > 0). Finally, we expect
that mayors who do not run for reelection (RR = 0) are unwilling to incur the cost of
signalling and thus would not attempt to increase investments opportunistically (φ4 > 0).
Likewise, the party of the incumbent mayor is expected to do better when the mayor runs
for reelection than when a new, often unknown, candidate is presented (β4 > 0).
The second group contains variables that are excluded from the equation for the win-
margin. Firstly, it includes two variables which are directly related to the availability
of funds, namely the average capital transfer from the national government during the
preceding election term (CTtm) and the election year change in the capital transfer (∆CT ).
Theory suggests that the availability of funds, here represented by transfers, increases the
opportunistic distortion in election years without having a direct eﬀect on the win-margin.
We expect that φ5 and φ6 are positive. Secondly, the second group also includes two
variables that are related to voter awareness which, as suggested by the theory, tends to
reduce the magnitude of the political business cycle. Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004)
in their study of the budget cycle in Russian regions use education and urbanization to
measure voter awareness. Unfortunately, data on education attainment at the municipality
level are not available for the time period analyzed in this paper. But, in Portugal, older
people have, on average, much less education than younger people. Thus, we can use
the percentage of the population over 65 years of age (Pop65) to proxy for low average
education levels22 and use population density (PopDens) to proxy for urbanization. We
expect Pop65 to be associated with low and PopDens to be associated with high levels of
voter awareness and we predict that φ7 > 0 and φ8 < 0. Finally, this group also includes
a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the mayor belongs to a right-wing party (Right).
We have no prior on the sign of φ9.
The third group contains variables that are excluded from the equation for the oppor-
22The same applies to the illiteracy rate, which will also be used in the empirical analysis.
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tunistic distortion. According to Carsey and Wright (1998), the electorate may wish to
reward, or punish, the national government in second tier (local) elections. Since voters
tend to punish the national government for bad economic outcomes,23 higher unemploy-
ment rates should lead to a lower percentage of votes for incumbent mayors who belong to
the same party as the national government. We capture this with the variable GP which is
the interaction between a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the mayor belongs to
the same party as the prime minister of Portugal and the national unemployment rate.24
A negative sign is expected for β6. Since voters are expected to reward mayors who achieve
high levels of municipal employment (Emp) or high average municipal real wages (Wages)
during their tenure, we also expect β7 and β8 to be positive. Finally, we include the win-
margin in the previous election (WMi,prev.el.). This variable picks up unobserved factors
such as the mayor’s personal characteristics and ideology and party aﬃliation of voters.
We expect persistence in voter preferences (and thus in voting behavior) and predict that
β5 is positive.
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. Since the win-margin measures the
diﬀerence in the percentage of votes between the incumbent and his main opponent, it
assumes a negative value in case of defeat. The win-margin in the previous election must
be positive, since it refers to the results obtained by the incumbent mayor. In some cases,
the percentage deviation of investment expenditures from the election term average is
negative, indicating that not all mayors behave opportunistically.
[Insert Table 1 here]
5 Results
The results of the estimation of equations (19) and (20) as a system of simultaneous
equations, using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM),25 are reported in the first
23For evidence on the Portuguese case, at the national level, see Veiga and Veiga (2004a and 2004b).
For a survey of the international literature, see Paldam (2004).
24The interacted variables will also be included in the estimations of equation (19).
25GMM is a robust estimator in that it does not require information of the exact distribution of the
disturbances, which is an advantage relative to FIML that assumes that the contemporaneous errors have
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two columns of Table 2. T-statistics are shown in parenthesis and the levels of statisti-
cal significance of the estimated coeﬃcients are signalled with asterisks. The number of
observations and the adjusted R-squared for each equation are also reported.26
[Insert Table 2 here]
There is clear support for the main predictions of the RPBC model: opportunism
pays oﬀ, as the opportunistic distortion has a statistically significant positive eﬀect on the
win-margin in both specifications of equation (19), and the win-margin has the expected
negative eﬀect on the size of the opportunistic distortion in both specifications of equation
(20). In other words, the data strongly support the prediction that incumbent politicians
can increase their reelection chances by inflating spending in the year before an election
and that they have most reason or incentive to do so when they expect the election race to
be close or when they are lagging behind their main opponent in the polls. Opportunistic
behavior is minimized when the incumbent expects a comfortable victory margin.
Concerning the magnitude of the eﬀects, a one-point increase in the opportunistic dis-
tortion, increases the win-margin by approximately 0.06 points, while a one-point increase
in the win-margin decreases the opportunistic distortion by 0.3 points. Although the first
eﬀect may seem small, if a mayor, in the election year, doubles investment expenditures
relative to their election term average, the win-margin increases by 6 points, which could be
the diﬀerence between winning and losing a close election. The second eﬀect implies that
a one-standard deviation increase in the win-margin decreases the opportunistic distortion
by roughly 6 points.
a joint normal distribution. GMM estimation is based upon the assumption that the disturbances in the
equations are uncorrelated with a set of instrumental variables. The GMM estimator selects parameter
estimates so that the correlations between the instruments and disturbances are as close to zero as possible,
as defined by a criterion function. By choosing the weighting matrix in the criterion function appropriately,
GMM can be made robust to heteroskedasticity and/or autocorrelation of unknown form. In fact, in the
presence of heteroskedasticity the GMM estimator brings eﬃciency gains relative to 3SLS.
26The specifications include dummy variables for municipalities (municipal fixed eﬀects) and election
years. In order to check if results were sensitive to the geographical dummies chosen, two alternatives were
also implemented. First, dummies for districts replaced the municipal fixed eﬀects (there are 18 districts
in mainland Portugal). Second, we included dummy variables for three of the four population categories
that, according to the Portuguese law, are used to determine the mayors’ wages. Results, available upon
request, are virtually identical to those obtained when using municipal dummy variables.
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Our estimates also give support to some of the secondary hypotheses. Firstly, from the
estimates of equation (19) there is evidence that the win-margin is persistent, that time in
oﬃce reduces the win-margin, that the mayor’s party does better when the incumbent runs
for reelection, and that mayors belonging to the same party as the national government are
penalized in municipal elections for high national unemployment.27 Municipal employment
(Emp) and average real wages (Wages) turned out to be statistically insignificant in the
specification reported in column 1. Since the inclusion of these variables reduces the sample
size substantially, because data on employment and wages are available only from 1985
onwards, we decided to exclude them from the specifications reported in the following
columns and tables.28
Secondly, from the estimation of equation (20), we note that the data support the
hypothesis that opportunism is greater when the incumbent runs for reelection, when she
belongs to a left-wing party (Right=0), and when there are increases in capital transfers
from the national government in the election year. But, opportunism does not seem to
depend on average investment expenditures over the election term, on the number of years
the mayor has been in oﬃce, on the average capital transfers over the election term, or
on the proxies for voter awareness (percentage of the population over 65 years old and
population density).29
To check the robustness of these results to alternative system estimation methods, we
also performed the estimations using Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS) and Full Informa-
tion Maximum Likelihood (FIML). Results, reported in columns 3 (3SLS) and 4 (FIML)
of Table 2, are practically the same as those of column 2 (GMM). Thus, regardless of
the system estimation method chosen, there is clear empirical support for the theoretical
predictions.30
27This eﬀect is, however, not significant in the specification reported in column 1.
28The number of observations rises from 1214 to 1463 (an increase of 17%), and Wald tests allow the
exclusion of these variables.
29Results are similar when the illiteracy rate is used instead. Although population density is statistically
significant in the estimation of column 1, which has the smallest number of observations, that is not the
case in columns 2 and 4, and this variable is only weakly significant in column 3. Thus, there is little or
no evidence that population density aﬀects opportunism.
30In order to save space, we will only report GMM results in the following tables (3 and 4). But, it is
worth noting that those obtained when using 3SLS or FIML are very similar, and are available from the
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The evidence presented in Table 2 looks for opportunistic distortions in investment
expenditures. In Table 3, we report the results for other expenditure categories. Although
the two main predictions of the RPBC model still receive empirical support in the spec-
ification with total expenditures (column 1), results are weaker than those obtained for
investment expenditures: the opportunistic distortion is only weakly statistically signifi-
cant in the estimation of equation (19) and the coeﬃcient on the win-margin in equation
(20) is much smaller (-0.099 against -0.280). While the results for total capital expendi-
tures are similar to those for investment expenditure (column 3), the results for current
expenditures (column 2) do not accord with theory. However, as explained in section 2,
Portuguese mayors have relatively little control over current expenditures and it is, there-
fore, not surprising that these are not opportunistically managed. Finally, in column 4, we
used the subdivision of investment expenditures for which Veiga and Veiga (2007) found
the most convincing evidence of opportunism - Miscellaneous Constructions. Here results
are clearly supportive of the theoretical model’s predictions. Furthermore, the coeﬃcient
of -0.342 for the win-margin in the estimation of equation (20) is greater in absolute value
than any of those obtained for other expenditure items, indicating that the opportunistic
distortion is greatest for this expenditure item.
[Insert Table 3 here]
In the first two columns of Table 4, we report results for an alternative specification
where we use the level of investment expenditures in the election year instead of the
percentage deviation of investment expenditures from their election term average as a
measure of the opportunistic distortion. Since the former is highly correlated with the
election term average, the later variable was excluded from equation (19). In equation
(20), investment expenditures in the previous year replaces the term average of those
expenditures, in order to better account for the persistence in this series.
[Insert Table 4 here]
authors upon request.
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Results are very similar to those of Table 2. Again, opportunism pays oﬀ, as higher
investment expenditures in the election year lead to a larger win-margin for the incumbent
party. Also as expected, investment expenditures in the election year are larger the smaller
the (expected) win-margin is. Compared to the specification with deviations from the
election term average (Table 2), there is, however, less evidence that opportunism depends
on whether or not the mayor runs for reelection or on her ideology. On the other hand,
the election term average of capital transfers is highly statistically significant in all the
specifications reported in Table 4. Results obtained for total expenditures (column 3) and
capital expenditures (column 4) are similar.
6 Conclusion
Building on the literatures of political business cycles and vote and popularity functions,
this paper presents a theoretical model and empirical tests which combine the two sides
of the interaction between economics and politics. A voting function and an equation
for the determinants of opportunistic economic policies are estimated as a system of two
simultaneous equations, using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), for a sample
comprising 275 Portuguese municipalities and covering the period 1979-2001.
The empirical results clearly support the hypothesis that opportunism pays oﬀ, as
greater expenditures in the election year (when compared to the election term average or,
simply in euros per capita) lead to greater vote diﬀerences between the incumbent and her
main opponent. There is also evidence of persistence in vote diﬀerences and of a negative
eﬀect of time in oﬃce. Moreover, we find that the mayor’s party does better when the
incumbent runs for reelection, and that the party that controls the national government
is penalized in municipal elections for high national unemployment.
The hypothesis that the magnitude of opportunism is inversely proportional to the
estimated win-margin also receives empirical support. Thus, the opportunistic distortion
is smaller when the incumbent expects to win by a comfortable margin, and is greater when
the election is close or if the incumbent lags behind her main opponent. Opportunism will
also be greater when the incumbent runs for reelection, when she belongs to a left-wing
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party, and when there are increases in capital transfers from the central government in the
election year.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 We start by constructing the set of separating equilibria and
then impose restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs to narrow down the set down to a
singleton and to rule out pooling equilibria. Let
©
gL1,1, gH1,1
ª
denote candidate first-period
equilibrium strategies of the two types of incumbents with gL1,1 6= gH1,1. Firstly, in any
separating equilibrium an incumbent of type Lmust chose the short-run optimal allocation
of first-period resources, i.e., gL1,1 =
τ+εL
1+βθ . Thus, Bayes’s rule implies that bρ³ τ+εL1+βθ´ = 0.
Under the assumption that citizen-voters hold pessimistic out-of-equilibrium beliefs in the
sense that for any g1,1 6= gH1,1, bρ (g1,1) = 0, it would not be beneficial for an incumbent of
type L to pretend to be of type H if
C
¡
gH1,1, εL
¢
≥ β (π (1)− π (0))V (εL) . (21)
Moreover, an incumbent of type H prefers to play gH1,1 rather than his short-run optimal
choice τ+εH
1+βθ if
C
¡
gH1,1, εH
¢
≤ β (π (1)− π (0))V (εH) . (22)
Notice that these the two intervals overlap, that any gH1,1 within this intersection is a
separating PBE and that the intersection may contain τ+εH
1+βθ . Call the intersection A.
Since for g1,1 ∈ A an incumbent of type H is worse oﬀ the further away gH1,1 is from τ+εH1+βθ ,
all separating equilibria within A are dominated by gH1,1 = gs (defined in equation (11))
and can be ruled out by assuming that citizen-voters hold the (out-of-equilibrium) belief
that the incumbent is of type H for all g1,1 ∈ A. Pooling equilibria in which both types
set g1,1 = τ+εH1+βθ can be ruled out by the intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) as in
Rogoﬀ (1990).
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
 
Variable Name Variable 
Abbreviation
Obs. Mean Stand. 
Dev. 
Min. Max.
Win-Margin (vote difference) WM 1889 14.49 20.28 -72.62 87.93
Win-Margin in the previous election WMprev.el. 1897 19.32 14.64 0.02 87.93
Investment Expenditures InvExp 1772 182.69 137.28 5.04 1439.10
Investment Expenditures (Term Mean) IE 1623 162.35 105.02 14.13 944.52
Opportunistic Distortion: % Deviation 
of Investment Expenditures from 
their Term Mean 
OD 1500 13.96 30.31 -88.55 169.34
Average Real Wages Wages 1367 515.32 115.65 290.67 1196.98
Capital Transfers (Term Mean) CTtm 1623 129.53 92.54 16.97 879.48
% Change in Capital Transfers (From 
Previous Year) 
ΔCT 1522 10.82 40.30 -87.38 287.56
Government’s Party GovParty 1893 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00
Government’s Party * Unemployment 
Rate 
GP 1897 2.79 3.28 0.00 9.17
Illiteracy Rate IR 1897 19.35 8.63 3.75 54.98
Municipal Employment Emp 1367 15.09 9.73 1.04 89.73
Population Density PopDens 1897 2.82 9.05 0.06 112.75
% Population Over 65 Years Old Pop65 1897 16.98 5.68 5.35 41.22
Right Right 1897 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
Run for Re-election RR 1813 0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00
Unemployment Rate (National) Unemp 1897 6.45 1.54 4.07 9.17
Years Mayor YM 1893 7.01 4.61 1.00 25.00
Sources: DGAL, INE, MTSS, OECD, STAPE. 
Table 2: Opportunism and Vote Difference 
 GMM GMM 3SLS FIML 
Votes 1 2 3 4 
Equation (19): Win-margin     
Opportunistic distortion (% Deviation 
of Investment Expenditures from 
their Term Mean) 
.061 
(2.60)*** 
.067 
(2.82)*** 
.038 
(2.52)** 
.063 
(2.35)** 
Investment Expenditures (Term Mean) -.001 
(-.13) 
.009 
(2.12)** 
.009 
(2.17)** 
.009 
(1.96)** 
Years Mayor -.441 
(-4.50)*** 
-.358 
(-3.68)*** 
-.326 
(-3.28)*** 
-.342 
(-3.19)*** 
Run for Re-election 8.554 
(7.70)*** 
9.754 
(9.47)*** 
9.235 
(8.06)*** 
9.160 
(6.99)*** 
Win-margin in previous election 61.585 
(16.2)*** 
51.390 
(12.7)*** 
42.838 
(16.2)*** 
43.511 
(16.0)*** 
Government’s Party * Unemployment 
Rate (national) 
-.363 
(-.59) 
-1.951 
(-3.32)*** 
-1.943 
(-3.10)*** 
-2.000 
(-2.96)*** 
Government’s Party  2.200 
(.61) 
8.426 
(2.35)** 
8.527 
(2.20)** 
8.666 
(2.12)** 
Unemployment Rate (national) .533 
(1.28) 
1.868 
(3.87)*** 
1.630 
(3.02)*** 
1.675 
(2.72)*** 
Municipal Employment .005 
(.10) 
   
Average Real Wages .001 
(.24) 
   
# Observations 1212 1463 1463 1463 
Adjusted R2 .24 .18 .19 .19 
Equation (20): Opportunistic distortion 
(% Deviation of Investment 
Expenditures from their Term Mean) 
    
Win-margin -.280 
(-3.47)*** 
-.214 
(-2.89)*** 
-.283 
(-3.22)*** 
-.274 
(-2.77)*** 
Investment Expenditures (term mean) -.016 
(-.89) 
-.005 
(-.32) 
-.007 
(-.54) 
-.007 
(-.69) 
Years Mayor -.099 
(-.66) 
-.054 
(-.39) 
-.045 
(-.33) 
-.048 
(-.36) 
Run for Re-election 3.489 
(1.77)* 
4.172 
(2.38)** 
5.055 
(2.73)*** 
4.957 
(2.55)** 
Capital Transfers (Term Mean) .013 
(.56) 
.001 
(.06) 
.005 
(.31) 
.005 
(.39) 
% Change in Capital Transfers (From 
Previous Year) 
.384 
(18.5)*** 
.372 
(19.6)*** 
.370 
(23.2)*** 
.372 
(27.3)*** 
% Population Over 65 Years Old .124 
(.77) 
.109 
(.68) 
.111 
(.71) 
.110 
(.73) 
Population Density .149 
(2.03)** 
.106 
(1.56) 
.123 
(1.69)* 
.124 
(1.55) 
Right -5.432 
(-3.78)*** 
-5.417 
(-4.09)*** 
-5.040 
(-3.72)*** 
-5.205 
(-3.84)*** 
# Observations 1212 1463 1463 1463 
Adjusted R2 .36 .38 .37 .37 
Sources: DGAL, INE, MTSS, OECD, STAPE. 
Notes: System of simultaneous equations estimated by the method indicated at the top of each 
column. Models estimated with a constant and with dummy variables for municipal and time specific 
effects. T-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 
1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
Table 3: Opportunism in Other Expenditure Items 
 Total 
Expend. 
Current 
Expend. 
Capital 
Expend. 
Miscellaneous 
Constructions 
Votes 1 2 3 4 
Equation (19): Win-margin     
Opportunistic distortion (% 
Deviation of Expenditures from 
their Term Mean) 
.076 
(1.69)* 
-.159 
(-1.79)* 
.059 
(2.23)** 
.064 
(2.07)** 
Expenditures (Term Mean) .004 
(1.60) 
.0002 
(.04) 
.009 
(2.35)** 
.009 
(1.50) 
Years Mayor -.342 
(-3.50)*** 
-.305 
(-3.17)*** 
-.355 
(-3.64)*** 
-.364 
(-3.68)*** 
Run for Re-election 9.848 
(9.63)*** 
10.169 
(9.92)*** 
9.856 
(9.64)*** 
9.096 
(7.82)*** 
Win-margin in previous election 50.991 
(12.6)*** 
50.120 
(12.4)*** 
51.427 
(12.8)*** 
59.948 
(15.0)*** 
Government’s Party * 
Unemployment Rate (national) 
-1.920 
(-3.39)*** 
-2.217 
(-3.80)*** 
-2.038 
(-3.59)*** 
-.385 
(-.62) 
Government’s Party  8.261 
(2.36)** 
9.885 
(2.75)*** 
8.899 
(2.54)** 
2.333 
(.63) 
Unemployment Rate (national) 1.920 
(3.86)*** 
1.366 
(2.58)*** 
1.995 
(4.13)*** 
.958 
(1.64) 
# Observations 1489 1487 1489 1212 
Adjusted R2 .19 .15 .19 .21 
Equation (20): Opportunistic 
distortion (% Deviation of 
Expenditures from their Term Mean) 
    
Win-margin -.099 
(-2.23)** 
.024 
(.63) 
-.197 
(-2.90)*** 
-.342 
(-3.39)*** 
Expenditures (term mean) -.002 
(-.31) 
-.012 
(-2.52)** 
-.026 
(-1.76)* 
-.054 
(-1.94)* 
Years Mayor .054 
(.76) 
.142 
(2.58)*** 
.002 
(.02) 
.057 
(.31) 
Run for Re-election 1.889 
(1.97)** 
.345 
(.43) 
3.123 
(1.96)** 
5.725 
(2.22)** 
Transfers (Term Mean) .003 
(.22) 
.010 
(2.22)** 
.028 
(1.34) 
.041 
(1.37) 
% Change in Transfers (From 
Previous Year) 
.194 
(18.8)*** 
.082 
(7.12)*** 
.340 
(20.6)*** 
.306 
(10.0)*** 
% Population Over 65 Years Old .166 
(1.63) 
.100 
(1.19) 
.147 
(1.00) 
-.049 
(-.22) 
Population Density .047 
(1.70)* 
.015 
(.71) 
.113 
(1.90)* 
.053 
(.36) 
Right -1.665 
(-2.30)** 
.661 
(1.12) 
-3.768 
(-3.19)*** 
-6.793 
(-3.90)*** 
# Observations 1489 1487 1489 1212 
Adjusted R2 .37 .15 .39 .19 
Sources: DGAL, INE, MTSS, OECD, STAPE. 
Notes: System of simultaneous equations estimated by GMM (with a heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation robust weighting matrix). Models estimated with a constant and with dummy 
variables for municipal and time specific effects. T-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at 
which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. The type of municipal 
expenditures considered in each model is indicated at the top of the respective column. Total 
transfers are used in columns 1 and 2, and capital transfers in columns 3 and 4. 
Table 4: Expenditures and Vote Difference 
 Investment 
Expenditures 
Investment 
Expenditures 
Total 
Expenditures 
Capital 
Expenditures 
Votes 1 2 3 4 
Equation (19): Win-margin     
Opportunistic distortion 
(Expenditures) 
.009 
(2.35)** 
.004 
(2.14)** 
.006 
(2.86)*** 
.011 
(3.40)*** 
Years Mayor -.445 
(-4.47)*** 
-.372 
(-3.85)*** 
-.369 
(-3.81)*** 
-.359 
(-3.72)*** 
Run for Re-election 9.185 
(7.96)*** 
10.127 
(9.90)*** 
10.008 
(9.85)*** 
10.040 
(9.87)*** 
Win-margin in previous 
election 
62.961 
(16.2)*** 
50.669 
(12.4)*** 
52.659 
(13.1)*** 
51.301 
(12.7)*** 
Government’s Party * 
Unemployment Rate 
.122 
(.19) 
-1.545 
(-2.60)*** 
-1.702 
(-2.99)*** 
-1.720 
(-3.03)*** 
Government’s Party -.986 
(-.26) 
5.657 
(1.56) 
6.951 
(1.98)** 
6.724 
(1.91)*** 
Unemployment Rate 
(national) 
1.138 
(1.99)** 
1.478 
(3.85)*** 
1.939 
(3.87)*** 
1.873 
(3.84)*** 
Municipal Employment .016 
(.29) 
   
Average Real Wages .010 
(2.23)** 
   
# Observations 1210 1461 1489 1489 
Adjusted R2 .22 .18 .18 .18 
Equation (20): Opportunistic 
distortion (Expenditures)  
    
Win-margin -.457 
(-2.19)** 
-.338 
(-1.68)* 
-.458 
(-1.95)* 
-.451 
(-2.19)** 
Expenditures (-1) .669 
(14.8)*** 
.647 
(14.4)*** 
.769 
(22.4)*** 
.561 
(12.3)*** 
Years Mayor .726 
(1.95)* 
.183 
(.51) 
1.210 
(2.89)*** 
.407 
(1.13) 
Run for Re-election 7.798 
(1.86)* 
7.387 
(1.90)* 
7.829 
(1.70)* 
8.681 
(2.14)** 
Transfers (Term Mean) .488 
(8.92)*** 
.532 
(6.54)*** 
.432 
(8.62)*** 
.643 
(8.22)*** 
% Change in Transfers 
(From Previous Year) 
1.101 
(16.6)*** 
1.029 
(16.0)*** 
2.398 
(19.1)*** 
1.062 
(16.9)*** 
% Population Over 65 
Years Old 
.211 
(.49) 
-.397 
(-.58) 
-.781 
(-1.28) 
-.074 
(-.11) 
Population Density .205 
(.94) 
.157 
(.91) 
.792 
(2.80)** 
.286 
(1.53) 
Right -6.753 
(-2.01)** 
-7.217 
(-2.22)** 
-13.590 
(-3.54)*** 
-5.041 
(-1.47) 
# Observations 1210 1461 1489 1489 
Adjusted R2 .82 .82 .91 .82 
Sources: DGAL, INE, MTSS, OECD, STAPE. 
Notes: System of simultaneous equations estimated by GMM (with a heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation robust weighting matrix). Models estimated with a constant and with dummy 
variables for municipal and time specific effects. T-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level 
at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. The type of expenditures 
considered in each model is indicated at the top of the respective column. Total transfers are used 
in column 3, and capital transfers in columns 1, 2 and 4. 
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